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1 Writing in 1977, George Harris observed that ‘serious Kurdish conflict, therefore, now
appears to be a thing of the past’ (Harris 1977: 124). Yet Kurdish nationalism has proved
to  be  a  resilient  and  resourceful  force.  Paralleling  the  rise  of  militant  Kurdish
mobilization in Turkey and the formation of an embryonic Kurdish state in North Iraq
has been the proliferation of scholarly interest in Kurdish identity. In this article, I take
a critical look at several assumptions underlying the current scholarship on Kurdish
nationalism.  Primarily,  I  question  those  analysts  who  rely  on  two  principal
dichotomies:  the  dichotomy of  ethnic  nationalism versus  civic  nationalism and the
dichotomy of state versus society. Neither of these two approaches adequately captures
the  richness  and  ambiguity  of  Kurdish  political  identity  in  Turkey.  Also,  I  suggest
organizations  rather  than  ethnic  groups  should  be  the  focus  of  scholarly  analysis.
Finally,  I  argue  that  those  studies  which  operate  within  the  confines  of  these  two
dichotomies  and  conceptualize  ethnic  groups  as  unitary  actors  with  well-defined
demands and goals do not engage the most interesting questions. To demonstrate that
this is  so,  I  offer a number of examples of how the politics of Turkish and Kurdish
nationalism interact and affect the construction of ethnic identity at a popular level.
How  does  Turkish  nationalism  respond  to  Kurdish  nationalism’s  challenges  to  its
legitimacy? Why are electoral results in Kurdish-populated areas of Turkey not more
closely  correlated  with  the  ethnic  identity of  voters?  In  other  words,  what  factors
explain ethnic defection, that is, voters’ support for parties that explicitly oppose ‘the
national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify’? (Kalyvas 2008: 1048).
What  factors  explain  the  seemingly  perplexing  choices  of  the  Kurdish  nationalist
movement? I would like to offer tentative answers to these questions. The conceptual
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approach put forward in this article may contribute to a more refined understanding of
the trajectory of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. 
 
I. The Turkish State and Kurdish Nationalism 
2 Many studies of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey are based on two dichotomies. First,
these studies generally share the assumption that civic nationalism is ‘more virtuous
and  liberal’  than  ethnic  nationalism’,  which  is  ‘generally  seen  as  dangerous  and
exclusive’  (Wolff  2006:  52).  Many scholars  argue that  Turkish nationalism,  which is
perceived to promote Turkic ethnicity at the expense of other ethnic groups, fostered
and  radicalized  ethnic  Kurdish  nationalism.  Next,  scholars  tend  to  analyze  the
interaction between the Turkish state and Kurdish-speaking citizens of Turkey through
the lens of  a binary state-society distinction.  Several  examples suffice to show how
these  two  dichotomies  underline  assertions  regarding  the  evolution  of  Kurdish
nationalism. David McDowall suggests that any modern history of the Kurds must focus
on ‘the struggle between the Kurdish people and the governments to which they are
subject’ (McDowall 2000: 1). Michael Gunter claims, ‘Kurdish nationalism largely
developed  in  the  20th century  as  a  stateless  ethnic  reaction  against  the  repressive
“official state nationalisms” of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria’ (2007: 15).  The Turkish
state’s discriminatory, violent, and exclusive policies have had a decisive influence in
shaping  contemporary  Kurdish  nationalism  (e.g.,  Yavuz  2001:  1;  Smith  2005).  In  a
similar vein, Martin Van Bruinessen argues that state repression in Turkey actually
contributed  to  ‘the  strength  of  what  it  tried  to  destroy,  Kurdish  culture’  (Van
Bruinessen 2003: 57). Hamit Bozarslan also conceptualizes the relationship between the
Turkish state and Kurdish-speaking groups as being antagonistic and conflict-ridden.
‘[T]he relations of domination between the state and the Kurds would involve systematic
persecution,  marginalization and humiliation of  Kurdishness’  since 1925’  (Bozarslan
2003:  187).  The  Turkish  state’s  coercive  and  assimilationist  practices  such  as
compulsory Turkish-language education and military service together with experiences
of discrimination as workers in Turkish cities have contributed to the formation of a
radicalized  Kurdish  nationalist  identity  (Saatci  2002).  Likewise,  state  policies  that
ignore  the  Kurds  in  official  historiography  and  impose  the  symbols  of  Turkish
nationalism over Kurdish landscape have stimulated a chauvinistic Kurdish nationalism
(Canefe  2002;  Öktem  2004).  Analyzing  the  rise  of  the  PKK  in  the  1980s,  Kurdish
intellectual  Altan  Tan  claims  that  the  brutal  1980  coup  was  the  primary  factor
explaining popular support for the PKK (Tan 2009: 399). 
3 Such arguments, which reduce the evolution of Kurdish nationalism to a reaction to
ethnic Turkish nationalism and violent and discriminatory state policies, have not gone
unchallenged. The ethnicisation of bureaucracy that has caused ethnic conflict in many
newly independent countries has not been pervasive in Turkey (Wimmer 1997). Many
ethnic Kurds have achieved positions of influence and power within the bureaucracy
and are integrated into Turkish society (Cornell 2001). Furthermore, it has not been
empirically demonstrated that ‘the ethnic definition of Turkish nationalism preceded,
and was causally linked to, the development of Kurdish “counternationalism”’ (Somer
2004: 241). Martin Van Bruinessen also notes that the role of violence in the Kurdish
question is overstated and observes that many Kurdish elites have been willing to be
co-opted  into  the  political  system  and  to  downplay  their  Kurdish  identity  (Van
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Bruinessen 1999b). The most spirited challenge comes from Metin Heper, who argues
that the Turkish state’s policies towards its Kurdish citizens cannot be characterized as
being assimilationist and repressive (Heper 2007: 6). He argues that existing studies of
Kurdish  nationalism cannot  explain  ‘the  periods  of  relative  peace  and quiet  in  the
state-Kurd relationship’ (p. 181). According to Heper, Turkish nationalism is primarily
of a civic nature, ‘those who professed loyalty to the state were considered a Turk,
irrespective  of  culture,  religion,  and  language,’  and  ‘supplemented  by  cultural
nationalism’, which entails that citizens who ‘internalized the constellation of ideals,
values and attitudes that give rise to a ‘we’ feeling have been considered real Turks’
(p. 184).  Hence,  ‘Turkey  has  constitutionally  adopted  civic  nationalism...one  could
become a real Turk to the extent to which one adopted the ideals, values, and attitudes
of the ethnic Turks’ (p. 179).
4 Ironically, Heper’s empirical discussion contradicts his central claim that the Turkish
state  has  not  practiced  policies  of  assimilation  toward  the  Kurds.  For  instance,  he
states, ‘unless a person declared his/her being a Kurd publicly and demanded political
rights  for  the  Kurds,  the  state  has  not  made  an  issue  of  Kurdishness’  (p. 118).  He
continues,  ‘names  of  villages  with  Kurdish  names were  given  Turkish  names  and
parents were forbidden to give Kurdish names to their children’ (p. 163). Similarly, he
observes,  ‘[a]  person could go on speaking his/her mother tongue;  however,  if  that
person also spoke Turkish and gave his/her children Turkish names and adopted the
mores of ethnic Turks, s/he, too, would have met the nationality condition’ (p. 92). All
these practices that are documented by Heper are examples of forceful assimilation,
which  entails  that  an  ethnic  group’s  language  and  culture  are  institutionally
marginalized in favor of another ethnic group that is larger in numbers and controls
the state. To adopt the terminology of Mann, the Turkish state policies towards the
Kurdish-speaking  people  involved  institutional  coercion,  policed  repression,  violent
repression, and unpremeditated mass killings (Mann 2005: 12). The latter strategy was
applied to suppress the Dersim rebellion in the late 1930s (Olson 2000; Bulut 2005) and
conquer Dersim, an ‘internal frontier’ where indigenous groups in a peripheral region
resisted centralization and homogenization (Yiftachel 1996). 
5 Plenty of primary sources amply document how the coercive state policies have left
lasting legacies of discrimination and alienation among considerable segments of the
Kurdish people (e.g.,  Anter 1999: 31-34, 361; Cemal 2003: 15-34, 373-379; Ekinci 2004:
94-97; Kaya 2003: 24-39, 143-150). This legacy still persists. In the words of an old man
from Batman whose son joined the PKK, ‘I am paying my taxes, fulfilling my military
service,  yet  I  don’t  have  the  same  rights. I  cannot  express  my  identity  freely.’1
Furthermore, Heper sterilizes the impact of state policies on the Kurds by ignoring how
Kurds  are  perceived  and  treated  differently  from  ethnic  Turks  (e.g.,  Yeğen  1999;
Jongerden 2004/2005; Ülker 2007).2 He is silent about the indiscriminate violence that
targeted the Kurds in the early years of the Republic and again during the 1980s and
1990s  (e.g.,  Alınak 1996:  74-93).  Indiscriminate  state  violence  has  been the  primary
reason for why ordinary people join insurgent organizations in many political conflicts
(Ganguly 1996; Goodwin 2001: 235). Inevitably, he fails to understand how state policies
have fostered a deep sense of injustice and grievance among many Kurdish-speaking
citizens.
6  Curiously enough,  Heper still  operates within the frameworks of  the dichotomy of
ethnic nationalism versus civic nationalism and the dichotomy of state versus society,
Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
3
and focuses on ethnic groups rather than organizations in spite of his criticism of the
previous literature on Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. First, Heper uses ethnic labels in
an uncritical and ahistorical fashion. For instance, he writes, ‘the Turks came to the
conclusion  that  the  Kurds  had  tended  to  stray  away  from  the  ideals,  values,  and
attitudes ‘they had come to share with the Turks’, and in the process, their secondary
identity could replace ‘their generic primary identity of being a Turk’ (p. 10). Heper
writes as if ethnic groups are unitary actors pursuing clearly defined goals. In fact, the
complicated  relationship  between  ethnic  groups,  which  are  not  monolithic  and
homogenous actors, and organizations that claim to represent ethnic interests should
be critically  analyzed to  make sense  of  the  dynamics  of  ethnic  relations  (Brubaker
2002).  The interests  of  the ethnic  constituency are  not  always  compatible with the
interests  of  the  ethnic  organization.  Second,  the  Turkish  state  has  not  been  a
monolithic actor and its policies have been fundamentally affected by its interaction
with autonomous social  actors,  especially  after  the  transition to  multiparty  rule  in
1950.  While Heper actually recognizes that the civil  and military approaches to the
Kurdish question differ substantially (p. 179), he does not systematically analyze the
causes and implications of these differences. Third, the discussion of whether Turkish
nationalism is ethnic or civic is not very productive. The ethnic vs. civic nationalism
dichotomy has very limited analytical value in understanding the patterns of ethnic
conflict  in Turkey.  Civic  nationalism ‘is  not necessarily a  better or a  worse kind of
nationalism’,  it  ‘advantages  majority  cultures’,  and  ‘has  some  very  strong
assimilationist and possible exclusivist tendencies’ (Wolff 2006: 52-53). Hence, on the
one hand,  the authors who emphasize the ethnic elements of  Turkey cannot really
explain how millions of Kurdish-speaking citizens voluntarily adopt Turkish identity
and avoid any identification with Kurdish nationalism. On the other hand, scholars who
insist on civic or at least non-ethnic aspects of Turkish nationalism overlook the fact
that millions of Kurdish-speaking citizens have strong grievances against how the state
and media treat them. Turkish nationalism has been too ambivalent and characterized
by conflicting tendencies to be categorized either as ethnic or civic. 
 
An Ethnic Boundary-Making Approach and Kurdish Nationalism 
7 A more promising approach to the study of nationalisms is suggested by Fredrik Barth,
who  argues,  ‘the  critical  focus  of  investigation…becomes  the  ethnic  boundary that
defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’ (Barth 1969: 15). According to
Andreas Wimmer, ‘ethnicity is not primarily conceived as a matter of relations between
pre-defined,  fixed  groups...but  rather  as  a  process  of  constituting  and  re-constituting 
groups by defining the boundaries between them’ (2008: 1027). The process of ethnic
boundary-making involves many different strategies.  In the case of nation building,
state elites either ‘redefine an existing ethnic group as the nation into which everybody
should fuse’ or ‘create a new national category through the amalgamation of a variety
of  ethnic  groups’  (p. 1032).  While  the  first  strategy  is  called  ‘incorporation’,  which
captures the fundamental aspects of nation-building in Turkey, the second is known as
‘amalgamation’. The creation of a national identity on the basis of a majority ethnicity
inevitably  involves  the  creation  of  minorities  who  are  ‘perceive[d]  as  too  alien  or
politically unreliable for incorporation or amalgamation’ (1034). From this perspective,
the  formation  of  a  unified  Kurdish  category  that  transcends  linguistic,  tribal,  and
regional differences has partially been a product of the Turkish Republic. 
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8  The predominant mode of Turkish nationalism entails the ‘incorporation’ strategy of
ethnic  boundary  making that  marginalizes  all  ethnic  identities  other  than Turkish.
Public recognition and political representation of other ethnic identities is prohibited
because this is perceived to undermine national unity and foment polarization. At the
same  time,  this  strategy  has  aimed  to  enlarge  the  boundaries  and  transform  the
content of Turkishness. Several examples will be informative. İlker Başbuğ, Chief of the
General  Staff  of  the  Turkish  Armed  Forces  (TSK)  argues,  ‘[t]he  constitutional
recognition of  ethnic identities  aims to undermine the nation-state.  Nobody should
expect  Turkey to  administer  policies  that  target  a  certain ethnic  group in  political
arena.  This may bring the country to polarization and decomposition’.3 In a speech
delivered to the Turkish Staff Officers' School on April 14, 2009, he argues against that
the idea that political violence in Turkey can be described as ethnic conflict.4 According
to  him,  the  PKK unsuccessfully  attempts  to  generate  ethnic  tensions  and  violence.
Many  citizens  with  Kurdish  and  Zaza  origins  are  members  of  the  TSK  and  were
martyred in the fight against the PKK.5 All citizens, regardless of their ethnic identity,
are equal according to law. Başbuğ approvingly cites Heper and notes that there was no
ethnicity-related violence from 1938 to 1984. He even refers to findings from a public
opinion poll indicating that an overwhelming majority of Kurds and Zaza express their
emotional  attachment  to  Turkey.  He  concedes  that  ethnic  identities  can  be  freely
expressed at  the individual  level  but  should not  have any place in  politics.  Başbuğ 
argues that ‘politicization of ethnicity’ generates instability and violence in Lebanon,
Iraq, and the Balkans.6 Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi),
similarly pursues the ‘incorporation’ strategy. He argues that Turkishness should be
perceived as  the  national  identity  of  Turkey,  and that  it  does  not  prevent  Turkish
citizens holding other ethnic identities. At the same time, he opposes constitutional
recognition of ethnic identities.7 
9 Prime Minister and leader of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
construction of Turkish nationalism is both similar to and different from the views of
Başbuğ and Baykal. On the one hand, he also perceives Turkishness as a broad category
that encompasses multiple ethnic identities. ‘Turks, Lazs, Kurds, Circassians, Georgians
share the citizenship of Turkish Republic and are all our brothers.’8 On the other hand,
he is more willing to publicly acknowledge the historical distinctiveness of the Kurdish
identity. He argues that this distinctiveness does not necessarily undermine the unity
between the Turks and Kurds since they have a long history of cooperation and share
similar cultural values, which tend to be based on their common belief in Islam. In this
sense, the Turks and the Kurds do not just happen to live in the same territory, but
have  established  close  bonds  through  their  interactions,  struggle  against  common
enemies, and being members of the common Islamic culture. Hence, Erdoğan adopts a
position that is characterized by both ‘incorporation’ and ‘amalgamation’ strategies,
and aims to undercut the appeal of Kurdish ethnic nationalism. Since the Turkish state
should not be seen as a monolithic and static entity, these competing interpretations of
Turkish  nationalism  have  evolved  and  became  more  articulate  over  time  with  the
state’s attempts to counter the challenge of Kurdish nationalism. 
10 The  Kurdish  nationalists  pursue  several  strategies  of  ethnic  boundary  making  in
response  to these  constructions  of  Turkish  nationalism.  They  argue  that  the
characterization of Turkish nationalism as civic is no more than a facade to perpetuate
the domination of the Turkish ethnicity. Primarily, they draw narrower boundaries of
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ethnic identity in an effort to identify the Kurds as a separate nation from the Turks.
Wimmer labels this type of ethnic boundary-making as ‘contraction’ (p. 1036). Emine
Ayna, co-chairperson of the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi), offers primary examples of
an  ethnic  entrepreneur  employing  such  a  strategy  in  her  speeches.  She  reduces
Kurdishness into a certain type of political identity. In a speech delivered in Varto on
December 2, 2008, she argued, 
No one who becomes a candidate of the AKP can say, ‘I  am a Kurd’.  This is not
acceptable because the AKP’s policies deny the Kurds. Whoever becomes an AKP
candidate is not a Kurd even if she says ‘I am a Kurd’. This does not mean that we
are practicing ethnic politics. The AKP and the ones who claim that there is a single
nation [Turkish nation] in this country practice ethnic politics. 
11 She  further  argued  in  an  electoral  rally  in  March  2009  that  the  true  measure  of
Kurdishness  is  support  for  the  DTP.9 Hence,  an  individual  would  not  count  as  an
authentic Kurd if she votes for parties other than the DTP. Ayna’s strategy may be self-
defeating  and has  the  unwanted consequence  of  contracting  the  appeal  of Kurdish
nationalism because it does not only draw a sharp boundary between the Kurds and
other  ethnic  groups  in  Turkey,  but  also  qualifies  the  meaning  of  Kurdishness  by
restrictive  political  criteria.10 Ayna’s  definition of  Kurdish ethnicity  stands  in  sharp
contrast  to  the  multidimensional  and  ambivalent  ways  in  which  Kurdish-speaking
citizens  of  Turkey  articulate  and  experience  their  identities.  The  fluid  nature  of
Kurdish  identity  in  contemporary  Turkey  is  well  documented  (e.g.,  Van Bruinessen
1999a: 23-360). Even during the heydays of the conflict between the Turkish state and
the PKK, ethnic identity did not necessarily determine political allegiance (cf. Kalyvas
and Kocher 2007). 
12 Other Kurdish nationalists pursue an ethnic boundary-making strategy that is called
‘transvaluation’  (Wimmer  2008:  1037).  They  explicitly  challenge  the  normative
hierarchy established by Turkish nationalism and argue that Kurds should have equal
symbolic status and political power. An earlier example is found in the work of the
Cemilpaşazade  brothers,  who  argue  that  the  Turks  were  uncivilized  people  who
invaded a Kurdish civilization (Malmisanij 2004). The argument that the Kurds were
cheated after the Independence War has a long history among Kurdish nationalists.11
Ahmet Türk, the co-chairperson of the DTP, frequently mentions in his speeches how
the 1924 Constitution established an autocratic political  system and denied Kurdish
identity  despite  the  fact  that  the  Kurds  were  crucial  for  the  success  of  the
Independence  War  led  by  Atatürk.12 He  now demands  that  this  injustice  should  be
redressed by the enactment of a new constitution that offers recognition to the Kurdish
identity.  He  delivered  segments  of  his  February  24,  2009,  address  to  the  DTP
parliamentary group in Kurdish in order to criticize the prohibition of other languages
than Turkish in official spaces. This provides a striking example of how the Kurdish
nationalists respond to the state elites’ claim that Kurdish identity is not suppressed in
Turkey. 
13 The strategy of ‘transvaluation’ also entails contesting the hegemonic historiography.
Kurdish nationalists  reinterpret key historical  events of  the early Republican years.
They have glorified the Sheik Said Rebellion of 1925 and the Dersim Revolt of 1937 in an
attempt to establish continuity in the Kurdish resistance to repressive and domineering
state authority. Besides, the Kurdish nationalist movement has a tendency to interpret
all conflicts in which Kurdish-speaking people are involved as hate attacks that target
the Kurds specifically because of their ethnic identity. For instance, a group attacked
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Kurdish houses  in  rural  Kyrgyzstan in  late  April  2009 after  allegations that  a  Kurd
raped a four-year old girl. According to Kurdish news agency ANF, the attacks were
ethnically  motivated  and  aimed  to  expel  Kurds  from  the village  and  seize  their
properties.13 This tendency to ethnicize conflict is consistent with the observation that
‘[t]he ethnic nature of the conflict is always contested and not intrinsic to the act itself;
it emerges through after-the-fact interpretative claims’ (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 444).
14 In  parallel  to  the  strategy  of  ‘transvaluation’,  Kurdish  nationalists  also  legitimize
political violence by arguing that restrictions on Kurdish identity would not have been
lifted if not for the PKK’s armed struggle. They insist that the PKK has restored dignity
to Kurdish identity and prevented its further humiliation.14 In a speech delivered in
Lice on August 13, 2008, Necdet Atalay, now mayor of Batman, declared: 
We were ashamed of our Kurdishness 30 years ago. How happy for these people
[PKK  militants],  they  have  taught  us  how  to  live  with  pride.  Now,  no  Kurd  is
ashamed of her Kurdishness. To the contrary, every Kurd is proud of her identity.
This struggle entailed tremendous sacrifices. I hail these honorable individuals in
your presence.
15 The  Kurdish  nationalists  do  not  only  contest  Turkish  nationalism,  but  also  try  to
articulate  a  crystallized  and  homogenous  notion  of  Kurdish  identity.  Yet,  Kurdish
identity is  formed,  articulated,  and lived in many different ways that  make it  very
difficult  for  Kurdish  nationalists  to  mobilize  all  ethnic  Kurds  under  their  banner.
Particularly interesting is how some people speaking the Zaza dialect of Kurdish object
to be classified as Kurds and pursue their own version of the ‘contraction' strategy. The
city  of  Elazığ,  which  has  a  large  Zaza  population,  organized  a  very  well-attended
protest against ‘PKK terrorism’ on October 24, 2007. The participants, many of who are
Zaza Kurds, shouted, ‘We are all Turks, we are all Mehmets [a generic name given to
soldiers of the Turkish army]’. A middle-aged person, employed in a state institution in
Bingöl, remarks, ‘The PKK aims to manipulate Zazas. They argue that Zazas are Kurds.
We are different. Why don’t Zaza establish Zazaistan then? Kurds should help us then.’15
Other  Kurds  resist  the  Kurdish  nationalist  narrative  of  ethnic  identity  for  more
mundane reasons. In the words of a high-ranking representative of the DTP in Istanbul,
‘Many [Kurdish] parents do not want their children to be politicized and join our party.
They  prefer  them to  have  good  education,  secure  decent  jobs  and  stay  away  from
trouble. For this reason, we are unable to fully mobilize our potential’.16
16 For  many  ethnic  Kurds,  there  is  no  rigid  boundary  between  Kurdish  and  Turkish
identity, which remain compatible with each other. The fusion of identities cannot be
solely  explained  by  forced  and  involuntary  assimilation.  Several  examples  can  be
illuminating.  A  Kurdish businessman who frequently  commutes  between Diyarbakır
and Iraqi Kurdistan, who was detained for sympathizing with the PKK when he was a
student at Dicle University in Diyarbakir in the 1980s, makes the following comment: 
We speak Turkish to each other even if there is nobody among us whose mother
language is not Kurdish. This is not because we have to, but because we like to. I
also speak Turkish with my children. They need to have a good command of the
language if they would like to be successful in life. Their future is in Turkey, not
here [Iraqi Kurdistan].17 
17 Another  Kurdish  tradesman from Diyarbakır,  who was  imprisoned  in  the  infamous
Diyarbakır military prison for his sympathy to Ala Rizgari, a Kurdish organization, in
the early 1980s, wants his five children to be fluent in Turkish. In fact, his youngest
child, a 9-years old girl,  does not speak Kurdish at all.  While he becomes emotional
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when he sees the Kurdish flag and soldiers in Iraqi Kurdistan and deeply admires the
Barzani family, he strongly believes that his children’s future lies in Turkey. 
18  Social stigma attached to the Kurdish language and identity also leads many Kurdish-
speaking individuals  to  hide  their  ethnic  origins  and adopt  new public  postures.  A
social-democrat engineer in the western town of İzmir observes, ‘We have a brilliant
engineer in our office. I know he is a Kurd but he walks to the balcony whenever he
speaks to his parents in Kurdish. He does not want us to hear him speaking Kurdish’.18 A
person who is an amateur film director and owns a video shop in Muş explains to a
visitor that Kurdish albums and films have fewer sales than Turkish ones. Yet, almost
all of his customers seem to be interested in the Kurdish products.19 A Zaza Kurd who
was born in a village near Palu, a district of Elazığ, now lives in İzmir after retiring as a
bank manager. His two daughters have no knowledge of his mother tongue, which he
refuses to speak. He deeply admires the achievements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. These
are examples of a ‘positional move’ that involves an individual changing his or her
identity in order to escape negative connotations associated with the original ethnic
group.  Such ‘long-term ethnic  switching’  entails  strategically  motivated  changes  in
language,  custom,  manner,  and  dress  (Nagel  and  Olzak  1982:  129),  and  does  not
challenge the sociopolitical hierarchy between ethnicities (Wimmer 2008: 1039). People
who voluntarily eschew or downplay their Kurdish identity have many motivations,
especially since negative stereotypes of Kurds are pervasive. 
19  At the same time, many Kurdish-speaking citizens also emphasize that they are treated
as second-class citizens and deprived of their rights. A barber who also works a security
guard in Dicle University in Diyarbakır relates that his great-grandfather participated
in the Erzurum Congress in 1919 as a representative of Van. He complains:
My great-grandfather used to address Atatürk as Field Marshal. Now look at our
situation. They treat people who recently emigrated from Bulgaria better than us.
They even treat Afghan refugees who were given housing in Diyarbakır better than
us.  Yet  we will  fight for this  state if  a  war erupts,  not  the Afghans.  We do not
discriminate against anybody. We do not want to be discriminated against. We are
the owners of this country.20
20 These  specific  examples  suggest  that  ethnic  boundary  making is  a  more  promising
approach to the Kurdish question than the dichotomy of ethnic vs. civic nationalism.
Two reasons for this conclusion can be cited. First, the relationship between Turkish
and Kurdish nationalisms cannot be adequately captured as the resistance of the latter
to  the  domineering  attempts  of  the  former.  This  relationship  is  interactive  and
dynamic,  and  both  nationalisms  continuously  mold  each  other.  For  instance,  the
‘transvaluation’  strategy pursued by the Kurdish nationalists  has  made the Turkish
nationalists explicitly accept Kurdishness as a respected ethnic identity. The state elites
are now at pains to emphasize that nobody is discriminated against because of ethnic
identity  and  that  all  ethnic  identities  deserve  equal  treatment. 21 State  TV  now
broadcasts in Kurdish, and universities will soon have Kurdish language and culture
departments. This explicit recognition of Kurdishness as a legitimate source of public
identity represents a sharp break from previous discourses that denied its existence. In
particular, Prime Minister Erdoğan articulates a discourse that has some elements of
the strategy of ‘amalgamation’ and focuses on common values shared by ethnic Turks
and Kurds. At the same time, the Turkish nationalists do not recognize the Kurds as a
nation  with  the  collective  right  of  self-determination,  and  accuse  the  Kurdish
nationalists for being divisive. In response, the Kurdish nationalists repeatedly reject
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this  accusation  and  try  to  emphasize  their  commitment  to  Turkish-Kurdish  unity.
Second,  Kurdish nationalism,  as  well  as  Turkish nationalism,  is  not  monolithic  and
includes several competing strategies. Nationalists on both sides strive to draw rigid
boundaries while ethnic identities tend to be fluid and permeable at popular level. They
try  to  impose  sanctions  over  behavior  that  is  deemed  to  be  inappropriate  from  a
nationalistic view. Consequently, ethnic categories do not automatically involve certain
types of political orientation and behavior. The relationship between ethnic identity
and  ethnicity-oriented  political  action  needs  to  be  explained,  rather  than  to  be
assumed. 
 
II. Electoral Competition and Kurdish Nationalism 
21 Perspectives that conceptualize the relationship between state and society primarily in
antagonistic terms ignore the role of electoral dynamics and cross-ethnic interactions
in the evolution of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. Elections often blur the distinction
among  state  and  non-state  actors  and  fundamentally  shape  the  nature  of  their
interaction (Migdal 2001). Social actors affiliated with political parties participate in
the elections and vie with each other for control over the ethnic constituency. Even
highly  autonomous  state  actors,  such  as  the  TSK  and  the  judiciary,  may  become
responsive to popular demands for greater respect for human rights.  The judiciary,
more specifically lower courts, is more inclined to punish security forces who commit
human rights  violations on occasions when civil  society activists  mobilize the legal
system, public opinion, and international linkages (Tezcür 2009).
22 The results of Turkish elections have not been closely correlated with the ethnicity of
voters, and political parties have engaged in appealing to the ethnic identity of voters
only  to  a  limited extent  (Horowitz  2000:  318-332).  In  fact,  ethnic  identity  does  not
automatically determine voting in Turkey. As the performance of the AKP in the 2007
elections demonstrate, centrist and multiethnic political parties espousing moderate
platforms  can  be  very  successful  (cf.  Reilly  2002:  167).  The  parties  that  claim  to
represent national interests of the Kurds have never received more than 7 percent of
the vote, even if Kurdish-speaking citizens are estimated to make up 14 percent of the
population (Koc et al. 2008). 
23 In Turkey, elections have helped to co-opt local Kurdish elites, to expand legal space for
contentious Kurdish activism, and to shape the nature of competition among Kurdish
political  actors.  First,  electoral  competition  since  1946  has  contributed  to  strategic
alliances between Turkish political parties and Kurdish religious, tribal,  landed, and
capitalist  elites.  The  latter  have  consolidated  their  authority  and  commanded  vast
patronage resources  in  exchange  for  delivering  votes  to  the  former.  This  mutually
dependent relationship between the state and local elites has been an important factor
in preventing elections from becoming agents of socioeconomic change for many years
(Beşikçi 1992: 53-56).  At the same time, electoral processes have been an important
force that offers ethnic Kurds avenues of political representation and power within the
system.22 A prominent example would be the long albeit intermittent parliamentary
career of Abdülmelik Fırat,  the grandson of Sheik Said who led the most important
Kurdish  rebellion  in  the  early  years  of  the  Republic  (Kaya  2003). Other  important
examples include Yusuf Azizoğlu who served as Health Minister in the early 1960s, and
Şerafettin  Elçi,  who  was  a  minister  in  1979.23 These  Kurdish  politicians  were  not
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immune  from  slanders  demonizing  their  Kurdish  ethnicity.  For  example,  Kamuran
İnan, who challenged Süleyman Demirel for the leadership of the Adalet Partisi in the
1970s, complains that his ambition was thwarted as his opponents highlighted the fact
that he is from the ‘East’.24
24 Second, elections have also contributed to the expansion and resiliency of the Kurdish
contentious political action. In 1967 the public rallies sponsored by the TİP (Türkiye İşçi
Partisi), which gained parliamentary representation in the 1965 elections, provided the
first  instance  of  Kurdish  identity  being  openly  politically  articulated  since  the
repression of the rebellions in the late 1930s (Gündoğan 2005).25 Since the early 1990s,
Kurdish nationalists have made use of the electoral opportunities to make symbolic and
policy demands from the political system, reach domestic and international audiences,
gain protection from state repression, and command material resources (Watts 2006).
Electoral participation also helped Kurdish nationalists form inter-ethnic alliances with
varying  degrees  of  success,  most  notably  in  the  1991  elections.  Not  surprisingly,
military  interventions  that  suspended  elections  and  destroyed  legal  avenues  for
Kurdish  demands  generated  spirals  of  radicalization.  The  1971  coup  led  to  the
proliferation  of  clandestine  and  conspiracy-oriented  organizations.26 Similarly,  the
1980 coup significantly contributed to the appeal of the PKK’s militancy (Romano 2006).
27 
25 Finally, electoral participation has not only generated opportunities for the Kurdish
nationalists but also exposed them to fierce competition. In fact, the behavior of the
Kurdish nationalist movement at critical junctures would be puzzling unless one takes
the effects of electoral competition on the movement into consideration. After being
sentenced  to  the  death  penalty  in  June  1999,  Abdullah  Öcalan  announced  that  the
armed  struggle  had  fulfilled  its  historical  mission  and  asked  the  PKK  militants  to
withdraw from Turkey. Meanwhile, the EU-induced reform process brought one of the
most  ambitious  democratization  periods  in  modern  Turkish  history.  While
authoritarian  practices  persisted,  legal  and  political  opportunities  for  non-violent
Kurdish mobilization were unprecedented. Yet, Öcalan and the PKK decided to renew
armed struggled on June 1, 2004. The reescalation of violence inevitably derailed the
reform process and contributed to a deterioration of the human rights situation. In this
context, the PKK’s decision to return to arms becomes understandable only when one
analyzes how the PKK’s control over its Kurdish constituency was threatened by the
rising appeal of the AKP. It was not a coincidence that the PKK remobilized its armed
forces few months after the March 2004 local elections when the AKP won in many
Kurdish provinces. The PKK intensified its attacks after the July 2007 parliamentary
elections when the AKP increased its share of the Kurdish vote at the expense of the
DTP. 28 The PKK tactically moderated its behavior and announced ceasefires only after
the  2009  local  elections  when  the  DTP  made  significant  gains.  Hence,  partial
democratization  had  the  unintended  consequence  of  radicalizing  the  Kurdish
nationalist movement when it threatened the movement’s control over its constituency
(Tezcür  2011).  Ironically,  the  reformist  AKP  has  become  a  greater  concern  to  the
Kurdish nationalists than the TSK. Hence, the primary goal of the PKK violence was to
perpetuate control over the constituency (cf. Bozarslan 2000).
26 Competition among Kurdish nationalists is as important as competition between the
Kurdish  nationalists  and  multiethnic  parties.  Kurdish  nationalism  in  Turkey  is  not
synonymous  with  the  PKK  and  its  ancillary  legal  organizations.29 In  fact,  Kurdish
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nationalism has been represented by at least two competing tendencies since the early
1960s, when expanding political liberties enabled public expressions of Kurdish identity
and culture. The fifty Kurds that were imprisoned by Adnan Menderes’s government in
1959 included many figures that later became influential political leaders.30 They were
not a unified group,  but were divided along religious and political  lines (e.g.,  Anter
1999:  164-169;  Miroğlu  2005:  173-177;  Çamlıbel  2007:  145-164).  The  first  Kurdish
nationalist organization to be set up after the suppression of the Kurdish revolts in the
early Republican Years was the TKDP [Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi].  The TKDP,
established  in  1965  and  inspired  by  the  Barzani  movement,  competed  against  left-
oriented Kurdish activists. 31
27 Since  the  1990s,  Islam  has  increasingly  provided  a  medium  through  which  many
Kurdish nationalists express their grievances and aspirations.32 The Kurdish Islamists
are represented in a diverse set of organizations ranging from the AKP to civil society
associations such as the Med-Zehra group (Atacan 2001), Mazlum-Der [İnsan Hakları ve
Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği], established in 1991, and Mustazaf-Der [Mustazaflar İle
Dayanışma Derneği], established in 2004, and to militant organizations such as Hizbullah,
which fought a  bloody war against  the PKK throughout the 1990s (Faraç 2001).  Ex-
Mazlum-Der  members  and  current  AKP  parliamentarians  İhsan  Arslan  and
Abdurrahman Kurt,  both of  whom represent the province of  Diyarbakır,  have been
influential in the making of the AKP’s Kurdish policy. According to Kurt, Erdoğan refers
to Islamic bonds between the Turks and the Kurds when he says ‘there is a single nation
in Turkey’.33 Obviously, his configuration of Kurdish identity is very different from the
DTP’s and has strong Islamic connotations. The Kurdish Islamists have taken advantage
of the opportunities presented by the AKP government, which saw the former as an
effective  antidote  against  the  secular  Kurdish  nationalist  movement.  The  Kurdish
Islamists hoped that the AKP would reduce the TSK’s political autonomy and expand
the scope of public expressions of religious rituals, symbols, and discourse. They were
instrumental in mobilizing grassroots support to the AKP in the 2007 parliamentary
elections, and are the only group that has matched the mass-mobilization capacity of
the secular Kurdish nationalists. For instance, the Kurdish Islamists organized a huge
rally in Diyarbakır to protest Israel’s attack against the Gaza Strip on January 4, 2009. 
28 The competition between the  Kurdish Islamists  and the  secular  Kurdish nationalist
movement has occasionally turned violent. For the latter, the rise of the AKP and the
Kurdish Islamists posed an existential threat to its claims of being the authoritative
representative of Kurds in Turkey. In Yüksekova, a town where the secular Kurdish
nationalist movement is the dominant actor, the AKP and Kurdish-Islamist associations
were subject to repeated attacks.34 The local branch of Mustazaf-Der was ransacked on
March 24, 2008, and the AKP office was bombed on August 14, 2008. Political tensions
continued  to  increase  before  the  critical  March  2009  local  elections.  In  a  separate
incident, hundreds of PKK sympathizers attacked a local Islamist association in Adana
on February 1, 2009. 
29 The Kurdish-Islamists  can be as  radical  as  the secular  nationalists  in their  political
views and demands. An important publication that disseminates Kurdish-Islamist ideas
is the monthly magazine Mizgȋn, which has been published in both Turkish and Kurdish
since August  2004.35 While  the journal,  based in Diyarbakır,  is  highly critical  of  the
Turkish state’s policies toward the Kurds, it  also keeps a distance from the Kurdish
nationalist movement. Furthermore, the journal criticizes the Islamic movements for
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being  insensitive  to  Kurdish  suffering  while  condemning  violence  in  Palestine  and
Afghanistan.  It  is  affiliated  with  Toplum-Der  (Toplumsal  Hakları  ve  Değerleri  Koruma,
Eğitim, Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği, established in 2004). The political proposals
and analyses  of  the  magazine  are  ambitious  and assertive.  The journal  argues  that
federalism is the best solution to the Kurdish question, and that confederalism and
independence should be also considered as  viable  options (Hocaoğlu  2009:  8).36 The
March 2009 issue has a ‘Great Kurdistan’ map that includes territory from six countries
(Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan, and Armenia). Kurdistan is labeled as ‘a country
looted on all sides,’ ‘a country everywhere under occupation,’ ‘a country whose land is
covered  in  blood  and  tears,’  and  ‘a  country  that  abounds  in  illegal  murders.’  Not
surprisingly, a judge ordered the confiscation of the issue. The April 2009 issue of the
journal has a cover that shows a combined map of ‘Great Kurdistan’ and remaining
regions of Turkey, which are separated by a white border, under the title of Federation.
37 The leading article in that issue argues that the most sensible solution to the Kurdish
question is the formation of a grand federation that includes Turkey and all areas in the
region with a Kurdish majority.
 
III. Inter-Ethnic Influences and Kurdish Nationalism 
30 As a final point, perspectives that exclusively conceptualize the relationship between
the Turkish state and Kurdish community as an unbroken lineage of hostilities miss the
interactions that have been crucial to the formation of Kurdish nationalist identity and
movements  in  Turkey.  The PKK pursues  a  complex and ambivalent  stance  when it
identifies its historical precedents and allies. The PKK neither condemns all Turkish
political activism as being hostile to the Kurds nor glorifies all past Kurdish political
activism. Its historiography tends to dismiss the DDKO (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları),
the organizational source that was central to the flourishing Kurdish political activism
in the 1970s, as being irrelevant and insignificant. Instead, the PKK traces its lineage
back to the Turkish rural guerrilla groups that mushroomed in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The PKK’s embrace of the iconic figures of Turkish left and discourse of inter-
ethnic cooperation in pursuit of common goals has its origins in the 1960s, when a new
Kurdish intelligentsia participated in leftist  political  activism. ‘During this  decade a
Kurdish  national  movement  was  reconstructed  through  the  inter-ethnic,
institutionalized, and legal framework of the radical left’, and has left a lasting impact
on the ideological premises of Kurdish nationalism (Watts 2007: 76).
31 According  to  Cemil  Bayık,  a  senior  PKK  figure,  the  PKK  has  restored  dignity  to
socialism.38 The PKK declared May as the ‘month of martyrs’ and May 18 as the ‘day of
martyrs’ in its 1st Conference in 1981. May 18 is the day when Haki Karer, an ethnic
Turk and a  close  companion of  Abdullah  Öcalan,  was  murdered by  a  rival  Kurdish
organization in Antep in 1977.  Along with Kemal Pir,  another ethnic Turk and PKK
leader  who  died  in  hunger  strike  in  September  1982,  Karer  represents  the  unity
between  the  Turkish  and  Kurdish  peoples  in  their  common  struggle.39 Their
participation in the PKK is a testimony to the insurgent organization’s commitment to
peace between Turks and Kurds and Turkey’s unity.40 The ‘martyrs’ who are embraced
by the PKK also include Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan, and Yusuf Arslan, the leaders of
the  THKO  (Türkiye  Halk  Kurtuluş  Ordusu),  who  were  executed  on  May  6,  1972,  and
İbrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of TİKKO (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu), who was
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murdered on May 18, 1973.41 Mahir Çayan, the leader of THKP-C (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş
Partisi-Cephesi),  who was  killed  with  nine  of  his  companions  in  a  firefight  with  the
security forces on March 30, 1972, is also considered a hero in the PKK discourse. The
deaths of these iconic figures of the Turkish left are periodically commemorated by the
PKK  and  its  ancillary  organizations.  The  PKK’s  speeches  and  discourse  are  full  of
references to their ideals and struggles. According to Duran Kalkan, a senior member of
the PKK leadership, Öcalan has burdened the legacy of Turkish leftist militant groups
that were crushed by the March 12, 1971 coup. Kalkan criticizes the Turkish left for
failing to cooperate with the PKK in its resistance to the September 12, 1980 coup.42 For
Ali Haydar Kaytan, another senior PKK member, the tragic fate of Gezmiş and Çayan
has deeply influenced Öcalan’s decision to engage in politics.43 
 
Conclusion
32 The argument that Kurdish nationalism has been ethnicized and radicalized in reaction
to the repressive and assimilationist policies of the Turkish state contains much truth.
Nonetheless it falls short of shedding light on the ambivalences and pluralism inherent
in Kurdish political identity in Turkey. It leads to a biased understanding in the sense
that  certain  expressions  of  Kurdish  identity  are  prioritized  and  others  ignored.  I
suggest  that  the  deconstruction  of  this  argument  opens  up  an  avenue  for
understanding how Kurdish nationalism has evolved in Turkey. First,  the ethnic vs.
civic nationalism dichotomy does not capture the complexity and dynamic nature of
how Turkish and Kurdish identities are constructed and interact with each other. A
boundary-making approach to ethnic identity presents a richer conceptual framework
to make sense of how Kurdish nationalism challenges Turkish nationalism and aims to
impose uniformity over the experience of Kurdishness. The question of how various
boundary-making strategies  generate  and redefine  new identities,  shape nationalist
discourses,  and  change  state  policies  demands  further  research.  Second,  a  rigidly
conceived state vs. society dichotomy underestimates how varying interactions of state
and society have been central to the formation of Kurdish political identity in Turkey.
In  particular,  a  rigid  state-society  dichotomy overlooks  the importance of  electoral
competition in shaping the strategies of Kurdish nationalists who have been deeply
concerned with threats to their political hegemony from other Kurdish actors. Finally,
studies that prioritize ethnic groups as the primary actors in the political process fail to
examine  the  dynamic  relationship  of  ethnic  organization  and  their  ethnic
constituencies.  Hence,  it  is  important  to  recognize  ethnic  organizations  qua 
organizations  primarily  concerned  with  their  own  survival.  They  may  sometimes
sacrifice the interests of the very ethnic constituencies they claim to represent when
the requirements of political survival contradict their declared political function. 
33  These three conceptual suggestions may help develop answers to important questions
regarding Kurdish political identity in Turkey. In this article, I make some preliminary
attempts to engage with such questions. First, why is it that so many Kurdish-speaking
citizens of Turkey do not articulate their identity in the ‘ethnic’ sense that is demanded
by the Kurdish nationalist movement? For sure, the coercive and assimilative practices
of the state provide a partial answer to this question. At the same time, hegemonic
Turkish nationalism has been ambivalent and porous enough to allow many Kurds to
pursue ethnic boundary-making strategies such as ‘positioning’ and ‘transvaluation’.
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These  strategies  do  not  often  correspond  to  strategies  employed  by  the  Kurdish
nationalist movement. Pluralism and fluidity has been central to identity construction
and boundary-making despite the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the
PKK. The recognition of this plurality also provides some valuable insights into the
question  of  why  electoral  results  are  not  perfectly  correlated  with  voters’  ethnic
identity in Turkey. The Kurdish Islamists, who have considerable grassroots support,
do not necessarily share the priorities of the secular Kurdish nationalist movement.
While they often engage in alliances with multiethnic political parties such as the AKP,
they  are  not  just  pawns  of  the  Turkish  state  and the  AKP.  They pursue  their  own
autonomous interests. Finally, why does the PKK often act in ways that are inconsistent
with its declared goals of expanding the rights of the Kurds, as exemplified in the PKK’s
radicalization at a time of increasing democratization in Turkey? One needs to focus on
how electoral competition jeopardizes the Kurdish nationalist movement’s control over
its constituency and the logic of organizational survival to come up with a satisfactory
answer to this question. Hence, one needs to overcome the state vs. society dichotomy
to systematically analyze competition between the Kurdish nationalists and the AKP
over the Kurds. 
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NOTES
1. Personal communication, Batman, June 2007. 
2. Reports prepared by the leading politicians of the early Republican era clearly shows how the
state perceived the Kurdish citizens as potentially destabilizing elements and developed policies
to diminish their ‘Kurdishness’ (Karabekir 1995; Öztürk 2007; Uluğ 2007; Akçura 2008).
3. He was then Commander of the Land Forces. Reported by Milliyet, September 28, 2006.
4. The violence in Turkey since 1984 can be described as ‘ethnic conflict’ not because the Turks
and the Kurds fight against each other, but because violence is perpetrated ‘across ethnic lines,
in which at least one party is not a state (or a representative of a state), and in which the putative
ethnic difference is coded […] as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence’
(Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 428). 
5. For state policies that distinguish between Kurds and Zaza in an effort to limit the appeal of
Kurdish nationalism, see Van Wilgenburg (2009). 
6. The  full  text  of  the  speech  is  available  at  http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/
10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/
org_ilkerbasbug_harpak_konusma_14042009.html 
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7. Speech delivered by Baykal in his address to the CHP’s parliamentary group on August 11,
2009. 
8. Speech delivered by Erdoğan in his address to the AKP’s parliamentary group on August 11,
2009. This speech was crucial in setting the tone of Prime Minister’s ‘Kurdish initiative’ in the
summer of 2009. 
9. In a speech delivered at a DTP electoral rally in İdil, a district of Şırnak. Reported by Radikal,
March 14, 2009.
10. Curiously enough, Ayna is not fluent in Kurdish and cannot deliver her public speeches in
that language.
11. For example, see Epözdemir (2005). 
12. This  argument  is  also  central  to  Türk’s  defense  in  front  of  the  Constitutional  Court  on
September 16, 2009. At the time of writing, the Court was still considering if the DTP shall be
banned. 
13. Reported  by  Fırat  News  Agency  (ANF),  April  27,2009.  Available  at  http://www.gundem-
online.com/haber.asp?haberid=71471. 
14. A  communiqué  published  on  November  27,  2008,  the  30th anniversary  of  the  PKK’s
establishment, claims that the PKK has created a new type of person who is full of hope, free, and
proud of her identity out of a nation that was forgotten and had lost its will.
15. Personal communication in Bingöl, August 2, 2008. 
16. Personal communication in İstanbul, June 18, 2007.
17. Personal communication in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, November 19, 2007. 
18. Personal communication in İzmir, July 17, 2007. 
19. Personal communication in Muş, August 3, 2008.
20. Personal communication, Diyarbakır, October 19, 2007. 
21. For example, the CHP leader Deniz Baykal repeatedly emphasizes that ‘ethnic identity is a
source of pride’. Reported by Sabah, June 5, 2008. 
22. The fact that Iraq lacked an effective parliament and strong mass parties for most of its
history was one of the important factors that left the Barzanis without any options other than
armed struggle. For a self-narrative of the Barzanis’ struggle, see Barzani (2005).
23. In  1961,  the Interior  Minister  attacked Yusuf  Azizoğlu  for  pursuing policies  favoring the
Kurds (Kürtçülük). Azizoğlu denied the charge, and, in a parliamentary speech, declared that he
was an authentic Turk. In 1979, Şerafettin Elçi declared that ‘I am Kurd and there are Kurds in
eastern Turkey’. After the 1980 military intervention, he spent 30 months in prison.
24. İnan (2007). Ironically, Kurdish nationalists accuse him for denying his ethnic identity.
25. These  rallies  definitely  had  an  ethnic  dimension.  Ethnic  Arabs  and  Azeri  Turks  did  not
support the rallies. Interview with Ümit Fırat, August 4, 2007. Available at http://www.bianet.org
26. These organizations were highly critical of electoralism. For example, see ‘Kürt Halkının Anti-
Sömürgeci Ulusal Demokratik Mücadelesinin Seçim Siyaseti’,  Rizgari 3, May 1977, pp. 107-127.
Available at http://www.lekolin.org
27. At  the  same time,  one  should  not  underestimate  the  pervasiveness  of  ethnic grievances
before the coup. For instance, see Howe (1980). 
28. Many Kurdish public figures who are not affiliated with the AKP concede that the party has
been  more  accommodative  of  Kurdish  identity  than  other  Turkish  political  actors.  Personal
communication with Esat Canan, Ankara, October 11, 2007.
29. It should be added that the PKK has not been a monolithic organization, but has fiercely
suppressed all dissent by violence (Marcus 2007). 
30. Their imprisonment and trial is known as ‘49’lar’ (‘the 49ers’) because one of the detainees
died before the trial. They were arbitrarily imprisoned to repress embyronic Kurdish cultural
activism.  After  the  military  coup of  May  27,  1960,  these  Kurds  were  left  of  out  the  general
amnesty. Their trial dragged on for years before all were acquitted. 
Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
18
31. The first leader of the TKDP was Faik Bucak, who was murdered in 1966. His son Sertaç Bucak
was the chairman of the Kurdish nationalist Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi (HAK-PAR) from 2006 to
2008. 
32. Hence,  Islam no longer  only  plays  a  binding role  for  the  Turks  and the  Kurds,  as  Cizre
Sakallıoğlu (1998) claims. 
33. Personal communication with Abdurrahman Kurt, Ankara, December 13, 2007.
34. Similar attacks also occurred in the city of Hakkari, the capital of the same province. For
instance, the AKP office in the city was bombed on November 1, 2008, a day before the visit of
Prime Minister Erdoğan, and a truck that belonged to a student dormitory operated by an Islamic
community was set on fire on the night of January 4, 2009.
35. The website of the magazine is http://www.mizgin.net
36. For instance, see May 2009 issue of Mizgȋn. 
37. While the April 2009 issue of the journal was also confiscated, I was able to purchase a copy in
Yüksekova in early June 2009.
38. Reported by ANF (Fırat News Agency), December 1, 2008.
39. See the interview with Ali Haydar Kaytan by Rojhat Laser, ANF, May 17, 2009. Available at
http://www.gundem-online.com/haber.asp?haberid=72306. 
40. See the interview with Cemil Bayık, ANF, May 20, 2006. Available at http://www.gundem-
online.com/haber.asp?haberid=12764.
41. One can also add Sinan Cemgil, another THKO founder, who was killed in a firefight with
security forces alongside his two friends on May 31, 1971.
42. See the interview with Duran Kalkan, a PKK leader, ANF, May 15, 2009. Available at http://
www.gundem-online.com/haber.asp?haberid=69527.
43. See the narrative of Ali Haydar Kaytan. Reported by Hasan Güneş, ANF, November 25, 2008.
ABSTRACTS
This article argues that the evolution of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is more ambivalent and
nuanced than is usually acknowledged. This claim is based on three interpretive approaches: 1)
the primary actors in national politics are conceptualized as organizations, rather than as ethnic
groups; 2) a boundary-making approach to ethnic identities is more promising than an insistence
on  an  ethnic  versus  civic  nationalism  dichotomy;  and  3)  state-society  relations  are  better
understood in terms of a series of interactions among state actors and social actors than in terms
of a global dichotomy of state and society. These three approaches may help develop answers to
important  questions  regarding  political  identity  in  Turkey.  First,  why  do  so  many  Kurdish-
speaking  citizens  fail  to  articulate  their  identity  in  the  terms  demanded  by  the  Kurdish
nationalist movement? Second, why are the electoral returns in those areas of Turkey with large
numbers of  Kurdish speakers not more closely correlated with the ethnic distribution of  the
population? Finally,  why does the Kurdistan Workers’  Party (PKK) often act in ways that are
inconsistent with its declared goals of defending and expanding the political and civil rights of
the Kurds?
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